The Stability of the German Housing Market by Voigtländer, Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Stability of the German Housing
Market
Michael Voigtla¨nder
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Ko¨ln, Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg
1 December 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43315/
MPRA Paper No. 43315, posted 18 December 2012 16:42 UTC
 1
 
The Stability of the German Housing Market 
 
Michael Voigtländer  
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, Cologne, Germany and Bonn-Rhine-Sieg University of 
Applied Sciences, Sankt Augustin, Germany 
Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 21, 50949 Cologne, Germany. Email: voigtlaender@iwkoeln.de, Fax: 
++49 221 498199741 
 
Abstract 
The last decade has been marked by cycles of excessive boom and bust in 
the housing market. However, not all countries have experienced high 
volatility in their house prices. Indeed, Germany has been unique in 
retaining flat price levels over the whole period and failing to respond to any 
of the macroeconomic shocks. The main reason for this stability can be 
found in real estate finance and in the existence of a sophisticated rental 
market. While in other countries monetary stimuli are effectively transmitted 
to the real economy via the housing market, the German insistence on 
prudential lending isolates the housing market from financial market 
distortions. By demanding high deposits, aligning lending to the mortgage 
lending value instead of the market value and by offering predominantly 
fixed-rate mortgages, banks reduce the risk of defaults and thus contribute 
to stability in the market. This system has evolved as a result not of 
regulations but of a sophisticated rental market which enables households 
to save their own funds for house purchases. This, in turn, explains the 
preference for fixed-rate mortgages. 
 
Key words: German housing market, housing finance, transmission of 
monetary policy, rental market  
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1. Introduction 
Residential property markets have proved extremely volatile in recent 
years. Between 2000 and 2006 house prices in the majority of OECD 
countries surged, only to plummet again in many countries following the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The housing markets in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Spain experienced an especially dramatic increase in 
prices followed by a sharp correction. Yet not all countries have followed 
this pattern. For instance, house prices in France and Italy seem to have 
been less affected by all the turbulence. Germany stands out even among 
these countries, however, since prices remained flat over the entire period. 
Neither the interest rate decreases at the beginning of the decade nor the 
subsequent financial turmoil seemed to have any impact on the housing 
market. As a consequence, with investors looking for safe havens, cross-
border investments into Germany are likely to increase in the next few 
years (Just 2010). Yet why Germany´s market is so robust still seems 
puzzling. Muellbauer (1992) recognised the importance of this topic as far 
back as the early 1990s and pointed out the relevance of the design of the 
mortgage system. However, he left a more detailed analysis to further 
research. Subsequently, several authors, including Giuliodori (2005), 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Miles (1994) and Kasparova and White (2010) 
have provided empirical evidence of the relevance of mortgage systems for 
house price volatility. All studies show, for example, that markets with a 
higher share of floating mortgage rates tend to have more volatile prices. 
Nonetheless, since the studies are predominantly empirical with the aim of 
incorporating the most likely number of countries, simplifications have to be 
made, so that the precise effects of specific institutions remain unclear. 
Even more importantly, no analysis has been made of the interplay and 
interdependence of factors such as a prudential mortgage system and a 
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low home ownership rate. Recent research in the wake of the financial 
crisis has clearly demonstrated how housing finance systems and 
institutions interact and shape the housing market (e. g. Shiller (2008), 
Jarsulic (2010) and Macdonald (2012). In this respect, however, the 
German market is still unchartered territory for international journals.  
As this paper shows, it is essential for an understanding of the German 
market to take into account the interplay of home financing and the rental 
sector. The availability of a large stock of rental homes enables lenders to 
set prudential lending standards which contribute to resilience in the 
housing sector. Describing the role of house prices in the transmission of 
monetary policy, this paper identifies how specific conditions, institutions 
and legal rules contribute to the stability of the market. To do this, the 
German market is contrasted with the British market, which is more familiar 
to most researchers. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, 
the performance of the housing market in the last decade is described and 
contrasted with other markets. Afterwards, the interplay between housing 
markets and housing finance is illustrated by reference to the transmission 
of monetary policy discussed, for example, by Iacoviello (2005). Developing 
this idea, it is argued that the different design of the German property 
finance market contributes to the stability of the market for real estate. In a 
further section, the role of the rental sector in shaping the characteristics of 
the market is highlighted. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.  
   
2. Housing markets and financial crisis 
The nominal price developments of selected housing markets are depicted 
in Fig. 1. The price data was obtained from the OECD, which collects 
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house prices from different national sources. Catte et al. (2004b) give an 
overview of this data source. 
 
Figure 1: Nominal price development in selected OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Prices have surged in most countries. In the period 2000 to 2005, prices 
increased by 78 per cent in the United Kingdom and by 102 per cent in 
Spain. At 56 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, the development was 
slightly more moderate in France and Italy. In Germany, by contrast, prices 
remained constant. The same holds true for the period 2006 to 2011. While 
prices in Spain and United Kingdom fell, the German market again 
remained constant, showing no signs of reaction to the significant 
macroeconomic distortions prevalent at this time. Although this 
phenomenon is most striking in the 2000s, the German market also ranks 
highest for stability in a longer-term view. Between 1970 and 2010 the 
German market manifested the lowest volatility of nominal house prices, 
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measured by the standard deviation of house price growth, as Table 1 
suggests. Since the same applies to real prices, it cannot be explained by 
lower inflation rates in Germany. The markets in the United Kingdom and 
Spain, by contrast, have values double or even triple that for Germany in 
this period. Astonishingly, US house prices seem to be as stable as those 
in Germany, which stands in strong contrast to recent developments. 
However, until the 2000s house prices grew very steadily in the US, and 
even in the wake of the savings and loan crisis prices reacted very 
moderately (Schnure 2005). 
 
Table 1: Standard deviation of house price growth in percentage 
points between 1970 and 2010 
 
Standard deviation 
of nominal house 
prices 
Standard deviation 
of real house prices Observations 
Italy 4.22 3.60 167 
Ireland 3.52 3.13 169 
Spain 3.05 2.78 165 
Denmark 2.78 2.82 169 
United Kingdom 2.70 2.85 169 
Canada 2.69 2.63 169 
Finland 2.65 2.74 169 
Netherlands 2.52 2.47 169 
Israel 2.50 2.11 73 
New Zealand 2.39 2.57 168 
Norway 2.27 2.41 169 
Greece 2.20 3.77 61 
Australia 2.18 2.14 169 
South Korea 2.17 2.31 105 
Japan 2.06 1.69 169 
Switzerland 2.02 1.96 169 
Sweden 1.94 2.09 169 
Belgium 1.80 1.84 168 
France 1.63 1.43 169 
USA 1.24 1.19 169 
Germany 1.04 0.92 169 
 
Source: OECD 
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As indicated in the introduction, the primary reason for this stability can be 
seen in the home financing system, which will be explained in detail in the 
following sections. However, a first glance at the stock of lending for 
housing purchase highlights the strong correlation between the housing 
market and the mortgage market (Fig. 2). Whereas in all other countries 
mortgage lending surged due to low interest rates and lax credit standards, 
the exposure of German banks to the housing market remained constant.  
Figure 2: Lending for home purchase in selected countries (index: 
1/2003=100) 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the housing boom was triggered largely by a 
credit boom. In the wake of the new economy crash and the events of 
September 11th, all main central banks lowered their rates, thereby 
significantly spurring housing demand. In almost all countries house prices 
increased considerably, and the credit boom, at least in Spain and the 
United Kingdom, resulted in a housing bubble. Germany was decoupled 
from this development, as will be discussed in the following section.    
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3. House prices and financial markets 
Monetary policy exerts a great influence on asset prices and their volatility 
(Bernanke and Gertler 2000).The interplay of house prices and monetary 
policy is illustrated in Figure 3, which is adapted from Giuliodori (2005). 
First, a textbook version of the interplay of monetary policy, housing prices 
and the real economy is presented. After this, deviations and the 
peculiarities of this interplay in the German market are discussed. The 
presentation of the transmission process is kept deliberately simple, with 
only an outline of the system provided as a guide to those aspects which 
are to be the focus of this paper. Giuliodori (2005), Mishkin (2007), 
Carstensen et al. (2009) and Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010) give a more 
comprehensive overview.  
The starting point is monetary stimulus. By cutting their base rate, for 
example, in order to increase the money supply, banks can reduce the 
interest rates for mortgages. On the other hand, the attractiveness of fixed 
interest-bearing assets like bonds decreases. Consequently, the lower 
interest rates stimulate the demand for assets like stocks or real estate. 
In addition, lower mortgage rates have a direct effect on consumption for all 
households who have a floating interest rate or want to extend the term of 
their mortgages.  
The growing demand for housing encounters a short-term inelastic housing 
supply, so that house prices increase. The appreciation of real estate 
stimulates consumption via two different channels: the wealth channel and 
the credit channel. The wealth channel was first described by Friedman 
(1957). Households who benefit from appreciation of their assets can 
increase their life-cycle consumption. More specifically, households can, for 
example, decrease their current savings when house prices rise so that 
consumption goes up. Although the wealth channel is plausible, most 
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economists assume that it is weaker than the credit channel (Miles 1994). 
Real estate is the most important collateral in an economy. Rising house 
prices thus increase the opportunities for lending money. This money can 
be used for various purposes, such as renovations or the amortization of 
credit card debts, but it can also be used for consumption.  
 
Figure 3: Housing prices and monetary policy transmission 
 
 
Source: author’s own illustration adapted from (Giuliodori 2005) 
 
The increase in consumption stimulates the economy and has a rebound 
effect on housing demand. Since housing is a normal good, housing 
demand increases proportionally if households receive extra scope for 
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consumption. As a consequence of this interaction, a virtuous circle can 
develop, until housing demand and housing supply match in a new 
equilibrium. US growth prior to 2005 is a good example of this beneficial 
interplay (Mühleisen 2003). However, the interplay can also be reversed. 
Increasing base rates correlate with mortgage and equity costs, dampening 
the demand for real estate. Depreciation of real estate diminishes the value 
of the collateral, which in turn narrows lending opportunities. The 
consequent reduction in consumption has a negative effect on prices. The 
US and other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have only recently 
experienced the devastating force of such a vicious cycle.  
Germany is seemingly prone to neither virtuous nor vicious cycles. This can 
be ascribed predominantly to a less effective transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks to the housing market. Marked A to C, the relevant 
relations are highlighted in Figure 3 and explained below. 
A Mortgage costs, consumption and house prices 
As a first step, the relation between mortgage costs and demand is 
examined. The demand for goods and services (consumption) and the 
demand for residential property stimulated by a change in mortgage costs 
are considered jointly, since the overall effect on demand is central for this 
step of the analysis. How households exploit additional consumption 
opportunities will be discussed in section C.  
While there has been little empirical analysis of the effect of mortgage costs 
on consumption, there have been a wealth of studies analyzing the relation 
between mortgage costs and housing prices. Using a SVAR approach, 
Jäger and Voigtländer (2006) estimate that house prices in the United 
Kingdom change by 7.5 per cent within two years if interest rates change 
by 1 percentage point. By contrast, German house prices react to the same 
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shock by only 0.2 percentage points. Demary (2010) uses a comparable 
approach, concluding that UK house price reactions exceed German price 
reactions to monetary shocks by a factor of five. The results of these 
studies are confirmed by, for example, Carstensen et al. (2009) and 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). 
The reason for this weak relation lies in the value and term structure of 
mortgages in the economy. In 2010, the sum of outstanding mortgages in 
Germany amounted to 46.5 per cent of GDP. By contrast, the 
corresponding proportion in the United Kingdom is 85 per cent, according 
to data provided by the European Mortgage Federation (2011). What is 
more, in Germany fixed-rate mortgages predominate. According to the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, only 0.5 per cent of all outstanding mortgages have 
floating interest rates. An additional 3 per cent have a fixed interest rate for 
one to five years. The overwhelming majority of 96.5 per cent have a fixed 
rate for five or more years. Unfortunately, the statistics fail to provide data 
for the sum of mortgages with a fixed term of 10 years and more, although 
most new mortgages have rates fixed for such a long period. Provisional 
data for 2012 shows that 71.3 per cent of all new mortgages have interest 
rates which are fixed for more than 5 years. In 30 per cent of all cases the 
rate is fixed for more than 10 years. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, 
most mortgage rates have traditionally floated. According to data provided 
by the Council of Mortgage Lenders, at the end of 2011 72 per cent of all 
outstanding mortgages had a floating rate. This has a far-reaching effect on 
the relation between mortgage costs and potential demand. Given that 
floating rates predominate in the United Kingdom, during the course of a 
year all borrowers will be affected by a change in mortgage costs. In 
Germany, assuming a fixed-rate period of 10 years, an average of only 10 
per cent are affected. If, for example, average mortgage costs are reduced 
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from 5 to 4 per cent due to monetary policy, almost all mortgage borrowers 
in the United Kingdom will benefit. Thus, the burden from interest payments 
will shrink by 0.85 per cent of GDP. In Germany, where only those wanting 
to take out a new mortgage or to extend the term of an existing one are 
affected, the same change in mortgage costs would result in an additional 
stimulus of a meagre 0.0465 per cent of GDP. For a similar change in 
mortgage costs, the effect in the United Kingdom exceeds that in Germany 
by a factor of 18. Even if we assume an average fixed term period of 2 
years in the United Kingdom and 7.5 years in Germany, the factor still 
amounts to 7. This rough calculation is enough to make clear why housing 
markets with predominantly floating rates respond much more readily to 
monetary policy. Of course, the relation also applies the other way round, 
i.e. increases in mortgage costs burden demand by a factor of 7 or more. 
Thus, it becomes clear why the German market reacted significantly more 
moderately to the changes in monetary policy during the 2000s.      
  
   
B House prices and consumption 
Real estate is the most important collateral in an economy. In Germany, 
some 55 per cent of all loans are secured by real estate. Nevertheless, the 
transmission from house price appreciations to consumption increases is 
weak compared with other countries. Catte et al. (2004a) calculate that the 
contemporary correlation between house price changes and consumption 
growth is only 0.24 in Germany but 0.85 in the United Kingdom, with an 
average correlation of 0.57. Miles (1994) confirms these results.  
The weak interplay between house prices and consumption can be 
understood in terms of three factors: Firstly, the comparatively low loan-to-
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values in Germany, secondly, the lack of mortgage equity release and, 
thirdly, the appraisal rules. 
Firstly, loan-to-value ratios in the German market are typically low. The 
European Central Bank (2009) reported an average loan-to-value for 
Germany of 70 per cent. Only in Italy is the LTV lower. Other statistics, 
based on bank surveys report German LTVs of 74 per cent. In the United 
Kingdom, by contrast, average LTVs are 80 per cent and more (Charles 
2011). With low leverage ratios, the potential for the transmission of house 
price appreciations to consumption is limited. This effect is enhanced by the 
lack of housing equity withdrawal in Germany. In the United Kingdom, if 
house prices surge, households are used to taking out second loans or 
raising a further advance on an existing mortgage without improving the 
property to the same extent (Reinold 2011). These loans can be used for 
consumption or the amortization of other debt. At the end of 2003, housing 
equity withdrawal peaked at a value of GBP 15.5 bn. In Germany, 
households and banks are not accustomed to further advances or second 
loans. If homeowners have repaid a mortgage, they can take out a new 
mortgage up to the original value of the first. However, adjusting mortgages 
to recent price increases is not common. 
A major reason for this is the way houses are appraised by banks. While in 
most countries – including the United Kingdom – bank lending depends on 
the market price of the collateral, German banks align lending to the 
mortgage lending value. The mortgage lending value is assessed by 
appraisers and reflects the minimum price of a property, i.e. the price below 
which it will not fall even in a severe downswing (Crimmann and Rüchardt 
2009). How mortgage lending values are determined is codified in detail in 
the Covered Bond Act (Pfandbriefgesetz, Verband Deutscher 
Pfandbriefbanken 2011).  As a rule of thumb, the mortgage lending value is 
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80 per cent of a property’s market value. The mortgage lending value thus 
reflects the prudential approach towards lending in Germany. What is more, 
it prevents the cyclicality in lending which is common in most Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Since the mortgage lending value remains fixed over time, home 
owners cannot easily take out a further mortgage even if market prices are 
buoyant. New mortgages can only be obtained up to the amount of the 
current mortgage that has already been amortized. Alternatively, property 
owners can commission a new appraisal to adjust the mortgage lending 
value to price developments in the market – if these are sustainable. 
However, as such an appraisal is costly, most home owners reject this 
option and take out a consumer loan or none at all. It should be noted at 
this point that banks that are not funded by Pfandbriefe can depart from 
these appraisal rules. However, so far not a single German bank has 
actively offered a product similar to a mortgage equity release. 
The absence of mortgage equity releases, in combination with prudential 
appraisal rules, helps to maintain tranquillity in the property market. 
However, it also removes the opportunity to take out securitized, and 
therefore cheap, loans. This is a factor which needs to be considered in an  
overall assessment of the institutional framework.  
C Consumption and house prices  
Not only do changing house prices affect consumption, but the stimulation 
of consumption also influences house prices. This feedback loop is the 
basis for the occurrence of virtuous circles, as experienced, for instance, by 
the United States in the first half of the 2000s. Yet in a downswing this 
same feedback loop leads equally surely to a downward spiral (Akerlof and 
Shiller 2009). As has already been pointed out, house prices in Germany 
affect consumption only moderately, so that the feedback is necessarily 
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weaker than in the United Kingdom, for example. This is only part of the 
story, however. Although housing is an important consumption good in the 
United Kingdom as well as in Germany, consumers spend less money on 
residential property in Germany than in the United Kingdom. A simple 
comparison illustrates this. In the United Kingdom, over the last five years 
the annual number of transactions in the property market has averaged 
1.185 million. In other words, in this 5–year period on average every 10th 
inhabitant was active in the real estate market. In Germany, by contrast, 
average transactions per year amount to only 0.465 million, indicating that 
on average only every 35th inhabitant purchased property in a five year 
period (European Mortgage Federation 2010). Even in times of crisis, such 
as 2009 and 2010, the number of transactions in the United Kingdom was 
double that in Germany. 
Real estate economics has generally devoted little energy to explaining 
transaction numbers. Nonetheless, there seem to be two straightforward 
reasons for this difference between Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Firstly, transaction costs are significantly higher in Germany. As a study by 
Zander and Faller (2006) shows, transaction costs in the United Kingdom, 
including notary costs, real estate agents and taxes, represent some five 
per cent of property costs, while in Germany they range from 9 to 13 per 
cent (real estate agents’ fees or commissions vary from state to state). 
Secondly, as mentioned above, Germany has a lower homeownership rate, 
which diminishes the potential for real estate transactions. Yet rented 
property is also transacted and the larger share of homeowners cannot of 
itself sufficiently explain the extraordinary difference in transaction 
numbers. As the figures imply, German homeowners change their property 
less often than their British counterparts. While climbing the property ladder 
is a widespread lifecycle strategy in the United Kingdom, most German 
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households buy only one property, which they use for the rest of their lives 
(Pfeiffer and Braun 2006). Consequently, in Germany only 28 per cent of all 
homeowners are under 39 years of age, while the corresponding share in 
the United Kingdom is 32 per cent. Even more striking is the 
homeownership rate among the age cohort of 25- to 29-year-olds, which is 
59 per cent in the United Kingdom but only 11 per cent in Germany (Chiuri 
and Jappelli 2003). With fewer transactions, feedback loops due to 
changing property prices do not arise. This contributes to the resilience of 
the German housing market. 
 
4. The role of homeownership 
The analysis has shown that the German market is less prone to volatility 
because of a prudential lending system and a low home ownership rate. In 
the past, international observers often supposed that the low home 
ownership rate was due to prudential lending induced by excessive 
regulation. For instance, a study by London Economics (2005) 
commissioned by the European Commission concluded that laxer lending 
could stimulate significant growth by enabling low-income households to 
become homeowners. With the emergence of the subprime crisis, this 
approach has fallen out of fashion. Yet even the assumption of an over-
regulated German market does not hold. German banks are allowed to 
offer all products which are available in the United Kingdom, for example. If 
they so wished, they could offer floating mortgages, negative amortization 
mortgages or mortgage equity release products (Voigtländer 2010). The 
only significant restriction concerns the prepayment of floating mortgages. 
In contrast to mortgages with fixed rates, banks are not allowed to penalise 
premature repayment of floating-rate mortgages by demanding a 
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prepayment fee. Of course, foregone interest payments caused by changes 
in the interest level cannot justify a prepayment fee in the case of floating 
rates, since interest rates always adjust to market levels. However, since 
this ban on prepayment fees prevents lenders spreading overheads over a 
longer period, they must demand a high margin on the rate to recoup their 
costs. Nonetheless, since banks could, but actually seldom do, circumvent 
the restriction by offering 2-year fixed-term mortgages, this regulation 
cannot explain the prudential approach to lending in Germany. 
While in the past prudential lending was blamed for blocking 
homeownership demand, the reverse assumption seems to make more 
sense: that the low homeownership rate in combination with a sophisticated 
rental market leads to a prudential lending system. In the United Kingdom, 
households experience difficulties finding a rental home of appropriate 
quality, so that low-income households and even young trainees apply for 
mortgages. This high level of demand from non-prime borrowers has 
spurred the evolution of a subprime market. In Germany, by contrast, such 
a market cannot develop since households with low creditworthiness 
choose to rent homes rather than take on mortgages with high risk 
premiums. The same logic applies to down payments. The higher the down 
payment, the lower the interest rate of a mortgage is, since risks for the 
lender are lower and refinancing is cheaper with lower LTVs. Households in 
Germany therefore save up their money and wait until they can purchase a 
property with a high proportion of their own funds. However, waiting is only 
an option if sufficient rental homes are available. Finally, the predominance 
of fixed rates is connected with the low homeownership rate. While 
households in the United Kingdom have to be flexible in order to climb the 
property ladder, German households typically buy only one property and do 
not take into account the possibility of relocation (Voigtländer 2009). Thus 
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the security of the monthly payments over a longer period outweighs the 
disadvantage of an additional fee in the case of prepayment.   
In this way, the supply of rental homes shapes the specifics of mortgage 
lending. The greater the supply, and the higher the quality, of rental homes, 
the more prudential lending can be. Countries chastened by the recent 
financial turmoil which now aim to imitate the German property market must 
therefore first improve and stimulate their rental markets. Since this takes 
time, the implementation of prudential lending without restricting the 
housing consumption of low-income households can only be a long-term 
goal. In Germany, the rental market has flourished since German law 
managed to balance the interests of tenants and landlords. For instance, 
rents cannot be raised freely but, since the 1960s, landlords have always 
had the possibility to adjust to market levels with a minor time-lag. In other 
countries, like the United Kingdom, so-called fair rents undermined the 
economic incentives to invest in rental homes, which were therefore sold to 
owner-occupiers (Coleman 1988). In addition, in Germany the level of 
home-ownership subsidies has always been significantly below that of 
countries like the United Kingdom, Spain or the United States (van Noord 
2005). 
 
5. Conclusion  
The German housing market is extremely stable compared with that of 
most other OECD countries. This stability can be attributed to a whole 
complex of reasons, not all of which have yet been alluded to. For example, 
the competition among at least 7 large German cities keeps prices down, 
as do Germany’s decentralised planning systems and the incentives they 
provide for the allocation of land (Evans and Hartwich 2005).  
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Nonetheless, the most striking aspects of this stability remain the market’s 
resilience to financial turmoil (especially during the 2000s) and its 
unresponsiveness to monetary policy. As has been shown, the prudential 
lending system is mainly responsible for isolating the German market from 
financial market distortions and fluctuations. By consistently demanding 
down payments, by relying predominantly on fixed-rate mortgages and 
aligning mortgages to the mortgage lending value rather than market 
prices, default risks are kept low and households are ensured a long-term 
planning horizon. This makes the housing market less prone to 
macroeconomic shocks of all kinds. Such a system could only develop 
because German households do not rely entirely on home purchases but 
can also choose to rent. The rental and home-owner markets are on the 
same footing in Germany, so that households can find appropriate 
residential property not only as a potential buyer but also as a tenant. As a 
result, households can afford to wait until they have saved up a 
considerable down payment and gained some certainty about their future 
location.  
The aim of this paper was to explain the stability of the German housing 
market, not to assess the superiority of this system. Of course, in the wake 
of the financial crisis, households and politicians have a desire for stability 
and some countries, like Sweden, are currently discussing how they can 
benefit from German experience. However, stability also has its price. For 
instance, German households cannot easily adjust their mortgages to 
increasing property prices, which makes their loan costs high. In addition, 
volatility is not a negative characteristic per se, since it offers opportunities, 
too. Generally, German households view homes simply as a consumption 
good, thereby ignoring the opportunities which arise from treating “housing” 
as an asset class. Here it should be noted that, even taking the recent 
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recession into account, British households’ experience of volatility is far 
from universally negative, with many realising large appreciations of their 
homes. More research, based on case studies, theoretical analyses and 
empirical investigations, is thus required to derive an optimal framework for 
mortgage lending. Such a framework might, for example, incorporate the 
advantages of both the British and the German systems. 
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